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COUNTRY:	Arab States	REPORT NO:	71-0007
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SUB-SOURCE:		EVALUATION:	Documentary
SUBJECT:	Decisions of the Political Committee of the Arab League		

1. The Jewish Agency Arab Information (Religious) Unit, dated 12/48 of 21 March 1948, stated:

2. "... the attendance, on the 17th Arab, of General Ismail HANNA, Commander-in-Chief of the Arab 'Liberation Army', and of 'Arab Council' at the Political Committee meeting in Beirut may have been designed to prepare for a declaration of Arab intervention in Palestine in accordance with American demands. Another reason for their attendance at the meeting may have been to ensure that the Arab areas of Palestine accept League decisions and to preclude any possibility of dissolving them."

3. "In its attempts to meet the American demand, the Political Committee tried to secure three objectives. Firstly, to accept a final and Arab solution to the Palestine problem which could serve as a basis for negotiations with Britain and America. Secondly, to accept an undertaking by the Arab and the Arab Higher Executive that they would accept the plan put forward by the League. Thirdly, to devote special consideration to the question of dissolving extremist organizations like 'Committee in the Arab Congress, in line with American policy'."

4. "Arab political circles experienced only one uneasy moment, this was when it looked as if the Big Four were about to decide that the intervention by the Arab States in Palestine constituted a threat to world peace. Subsequently statements were immediately issued by the Arab delegates at Lake Success, and by 'Amman in Beirut, that there was no foreign intervention in Palestine, but civil war. They claimed that the number of foreign volunteers in Palestine was negligible, and 'Amman even went so far as to declare that the Arab States would not forcibly intervene in Palestine so long as no foreign force intervened on behalf of the Jews (Al-Bustan, 20-21-22)."

5. "The Arab delegates to the U.N. firmly insist that the League must offer a positive plan as an alternative to partition. According to the Arabs, the British have given an expression of support for a positive plan. The Arabs also claim that the American Middle Eastern representatives are trying to secure their good will (Al-Bustan, 18-19). Apparently the decision meeting took place on the 17th Arab, when 'Amman and 'Abd al-Qadir met the American Minister and the British (Al-Bustan, 18-19)."

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before in Beirut. After this meeting, final instructions were sent to the Arab delegates to the U.N. which state it possible for the U.N. to issue the statement.

6. Despite this striking victory for the Arab speaking, it should be recalled that the Political Committee of the Arab League was only able to solve those issues which had been discussed by a earlier agreement. This (June 1955) pointed out that the Palestinian problem had been "solved" by agreement and that the main question had solved the only, whereas the representatives our own dispute still remained "unsolved".

Political Committee's Mandate

7. The U.N. as is known, the following are the main points involved upon by the Arab League's Political Committee:

(1) The establishment of a Palestinian state. This will not be called an Arab state but at the same time it is stressed that it will not be a Federal state. (Providence of the term "constitutionally" which might be interpreted as a bi-national state, was due to a desire to avoid any resemblance to "arabism" and to a desire to create a prior condition regarding the integration of 100,000 Jews).

(2) "Alevation" automatically to be granted to all Jews who resident in Palestine regardless of their former nationality.

(3) Assurance of international autonomy for the Jewish state.

(4) International representation to be accorded to the Jews in the government, parliament and local authorities.

(5) "Agitation on issues specifically affecting the Jews to be decided by the majority of Jewish representatives in the representative institutions."

8. While some obviously fails to lay down the final Arab objective in a number of concrete issues, and leaves a door open to negotiations. For instance, it does not mention the question of immigration. In an report some days ago quoted an Arab personality (Yassir) as saying that the Arabs would soon display readiness to agree to "the integration of the Jewish population. According to an earlier report, however, we confirmed, the Arab representatives in Paris refused to agree to the integration of 100,000 Jews. Moreover, the American statement, Yassir actually declared that "a Jews would agree to the integration of 100,000 Jews from Cyprus."

9. While some also fails to display a realistic view on the question of "arabism". Yassir stated that the Arabs would agree to a temporary bi-nationality, without, however, indicating the two nations should be. This statement coincides with the previous express declaration that the Arabs would agree bi-nationality. Agreement in principle to bi-nationality.

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skin on the part of the Arabs had previously been contained in the original plan of 'Aris al-Husni, which served as the basis of the Political Committee's decision. 'Aris had suggested that the trusteeship should be assumed by the Arab States. In order, however, to avoid an immediate commitment in favor of trusteeship, 'Aris was forced to retract his statement publicly as soon as 'Aris proposed a trusteeship. The Arab attitude on this question is by no means final, and the intention may be to secure a trusteeship administered by the Arab States."

10. "The official dismissal of Arab plans for a trusteeship, according to 'Aris al-Husni, was intended to remove any fears concerning a trusteeship. 'Aris even went so far as to state publicly that 'Aris al-Husni's proposal to the General Assembly last November for a trusteeship in Palestine was merely a ruse to secure the rejection of 'Aris al-Husni's plan."

Efforts to win Arab support for the plan

11. "The League has been making efforts to get the Arab Higher Executive to agree to the plan. The Egyptian Government has been doing much of the persuading, but it has had help from other quarters as well. The American Charge in Amman got into direct contact with 'Aris al-Husni. The latter evidently tried to adhere to its original intention, especially as its committee regarding the matter of the trusteeship had been set up and generally accepted. As far as the League has retained from expressing an opinion one way or the other on the Political Committee's decision."

12. "Apparently the proceedings in the Political Committee have brought the deliberations of the Palestine Committee, which met in Amman on the 15th, to a standstill."

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